Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk, Liquidity Constraints and Aggregate Fluctuations by Díaz-Giménez, Javier
This document is published in: 
?????????????????????????? ??????????????????
Doi: http:??????dx.doi.org/?????????????????????
??????????????????????? 
Uninsured idiosyncratic risk, liquidity constraints
and?aggregate?fluctuations?
Javier Dı´az-Gime´nez
Departamento de Economı´a, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126,
E-28903 Getafe, SPAIN
Received: March 6, 1996; revised version August 15, 1996
Summary. I study the role played by uninsured idiosyncratic risk and liquidity
constraints in the propagation of aggregate fluctuations. To this purpose, I
compare the aggregate fluctuations of two model economies that differ in
their insurance technologies only. In one of these model economies liquidity
constrained households vary their holdings of a nominally denominated asset
in order to buffer an uninsured idiosyncratic shock to their individual pro-
duction opportunities. In the other economy every idiosyncratic component
of risk can be costlessly insured. I find that the limited insurance technology
implies fluctuations in output that are 20% larger, fluctuations in hours re-
lative to output that are 9% larger, fluctuations in consumption relative to
output that are 18% smaller, and a correlation of hours and productivity that
is 15% smaller than those that obtain under the full insurance technology.
JEL Classification Numbers: D58, E21, E32, E44.
1 Introduction
In the last twenty years representative household models have been suc-
cessfully used to address issues in fields as diverse as growth theory, business
cycles, public finance and monetary economics. Central to these models is the
assumption that the decisions of every household in the economy can be
aggregated into a single, stand-in household. To make this aggregation
possible, representative household models, implicitly assume that every
idiosyncratic component of risk is completely and costlessly insured. In the
real world, we have ample evidence that this is not the case.
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Even in the most advanced of modern industrial economies the set of
idiosyncratic contingencies that are formally insured is limited. One of the
reasons that justifies some of these insurance limitations is the existence of
private information. Another related reason is the high cost of many in-
surance contracts. In 1989, for example, the insurance sector contributed 2%
of ths U.S. value added. Uninsured contingencies and the high cost of in-
surance provide important incentives for risk averse agents to find alternative
ways to smooth their consumption streams.
One of these alternative ways is to use borrowing and lending to smooth
out uninsured variations in household income. In the real world, however,
there is also evidence, that many households have limited opportunities to
engage in non-collateralized borrowing against future income. Zeldes (1989),
for example, finds strong microeconomic evidence that liquidity constraints
affect a significant fraction of households in the United States.
When households are liquidity constrained, one way in which they can
smooth out their flows of consumption is to build up their savings in periods
when their income is high and to use those savings to finance their con-
sumption in periods when their income is low. One can conjecture that M2
assets are held in part for this purpose. If we take this conjecture to be true,
the large size of M2 holdings1 suggests that this precautionary motive might
well have quantitatively important business cycle implications.
The main purposes of this paper are i) to quantify the business cycle
behavior of a model economy in which households are liquidity constrained
and vary their holdings of a nominal asset as a buffer against uninsured
income fluctuations, and ii) to compare the business cycle behavior of this
model economy with the one that obtains in a similar economy where every
idiosyncratic component of risk can be costlessly insured.
In the two model economies that I study in this paper households have
identical endowments and concave preferences, and every period each
household faces the same household-specific productivity process that de-
termines the market value of its time. Consequently, in the two economies
the households face employment opportunities that are both household-
specific and potentially time varying. Finally, in both economies, house-
holds face identical sequences of economy-wide disturbances, they are
precluded from borrowing against future income and the government must
finance identical streams of government consumption. The only aspect in
which the two economies differ is in their insurance technologies which I
now describe.
In the limited insurance economy I assume that there is no insurance
technology that allows households to enter into contracts contingent on the
realizations of the household-specific productivity process. I also assume that
households are prevented from borrowing against their future income. Given
1 In the United States, for example, M2 holdings have averaged about one year of aggregate
private consumption during the post-Korean War period.
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these assumptions, I show that in this class of model worlds, households
choose to hold a nominally denominated asset issued by the government2.
The idiosyncratic component of the productivity shock leads different
households to accumulate and deplete their asset holdings at different rates.
Consequently, the state of the economy is characterized by a time-varying
endogenous distribution of households3. The resulting high dimension of the
state makes the use of standard recursive computational methods im-
practical. To get around this problem, I assume that the government targets
the pricing process on the asset as part of its policy arrangement4. Under this
specification of government policy, prices no longer depend on the dis-
tribution of households, and the household decision rules can be computed
using standard numerical methods.
In the full insurance economy I assume that there is a technology that
allows contracts conditional on the realizations of the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock to be enforced. Furthermore, an event-contingent scheme
that eliminates all but aggregate uncertainty is assumed to exist. Given that
households are ex-ante identical and risk averse, they enter into a contract
that equates the marginal utility of their consumption streams regardless of
their household-specific state. In this model economy I also assume that no
nominal assets are held5.
I calibrate the limited insurance model economy to U.S. data and I find
that the limited insurance technology implies fluctuations in output that are
20% larger, fluctuations in hours relative to output that are 9% larger,
fluctuations in consumption relative to output that are 18% smaller, and a
2 With these assumptions I am effectively following Sheinkman and Weiss (1986), I˙mrohorog˘lu
(1989), Dı´az-Gime´nez and Prescott (1996), Dı´az-Gime´nez, Prescott, Fitzgerald and Alvarez
(1992), and others. An excellent survey of the economies in these last three papers can be found
in Rı´os-Rull (1995). An alternative way to depart from the full insurance assumption is to
consider highly stylized models and to link the structure of the financial contracts to features of
the underlying economy. This approach is followed, amongst others, by Atkeson and Lucas
(1992), Green (1987), Green and Oh (1992), Phelan (1989), Phelan and Townsend (1992) and
Marcet and Marimon (1995). Note that the holdings of this asset allow the households to
substitute in part for the consumption smoothing role of insurance.
3 Note that when there is no aggregate uncertainty, it can be shown that, for policies that result
in a constant inflation rate similar to the ones considered in this paper, the equilibrium path of
this distribution of households converges to a steady state distribution. This property simplifies
the computational problem considerably.
4 Note that a consequence of this type of targetting is that the process on government
consumption is determined residually. For a detailed discussion of the role played by the
government, see Section 2.2 and 2.4 below.
5 Note that the essence of this paper is to compare the aggregate fluctuations that arise in an
economy with an insurance technology that allows individual households to substitute
consumption intertemporally incurring in a cost (the real return on the nominal asset is non-
positive), with those that obtain in an economy where the consumption risks are spread
contemporaneously amongst all households, and in which the intertemporal margin is shut
down.
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correlation of hours and productivity that is 15% smaller than those that
obtain under the full insurance technology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sections 2 and 3, re-
spectively, the limited insurance and the full insurance model economies are
formally described, the equilibrium processes are defined and calibration
issues are discussed. Section 4 describes the computational experiments and
reports the main findings. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding com-
ments and provides some suggestions for future research.
2 The limited insurance economy
2.1 Information
There is an exogenous economy-wide stochastic process {zt}. This process is
a Markov chain and its transition probabilities are:
z z  z  Przt1  z  zt  z   1
for z z 	 Z  1 2        nz  I assume that the Markov chain generating z is
such that it has a single ergodic set, no transient states and no cyclically
moving subsets.
Each household also faces an idiosyncratic random disturbance, st, that
affects its individual production possibilities. These idiosyncratic dis-
turbances are assumed to be independent and identically distributed across
households. The processes for these household-specific production shocks
are also assumed to follow a finite-state Markov chain with transition
probabilities given by:
s s  s  Prst1  s  st  s   2
where s s 	 S  1 2        ns  I assume that the Markov chain generating z
is such that it has a single ergodic set, no transient states and no cyclically
moving subsets.
The joint processes on  s z are therefore Markov chains with n  ns 
 nz
states. Their transition probabilities are:
 s z   s z  s s  sz z  z  3
Households know the laws of motion of both st and zt. At the beginning
of each period they observe the realizations of both stochastic processes.
Trade ensues.
2.2 The government sector
The government in this economy taxes labor income at a rate . This is a
proportional tax and it is assumed to be time invariant. The government also
issues a nominally denominated asset, A. This asset determines the unit of
account and it bears no interest.
Variable pt is the price of one unit of the date t composite good expressed
in units of the nominal asset. The process on pt is denoted by  zt  pt1pt
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and it is determined by government policy. To implement this policy, the
government exchanges goods for the asset at the policy implied price p6t .
A government policy rule is, therefore, a specification of    z, and the
associated processes on government consumption, g, and on the government
supply of the nominal asset, Ag. Under this specification for government pol-
icy, the nominal version of the government budget constraint is the following:
ptgt  Agt  ytpt  Ag t1 4
where yt denotes the aggregate output of period t.
This specification of government policy can have two different inter-
pretations. First we can think of it as an inflation and nominal interest rate
targetting policy similar in essence to the policies followed by many gov-
ernments and central banks in the real world. An implication of this type of
targetting in the model economy is that the process on government con-
sumption is determined residually7. An alternative interpretation of the
model economies’ g is to consider it as the sum of government consumption
and net exports in a small open economy whose government borrows and
lends abroad to finance its budget. A technical discussion of government
policy and of the procedure used to compute the implied process on g can be
found in the definition of equilibrium below.
2.3 The household sector
Preferences
I assume that at each point in time the economy is inhabited by a large
number, actually a measure one continuum, of households. These house-
holds order their random streams of consumption and leisure according to:
 

t0
tuct   nt 5
where u is a continuous and strictly concave utility function, 0    1 is the
time-discount factor, ct is the perishable household consumption good which
is restricted to being non-negative,  is the household endowment of pro-
ductive time, and nt is time allocated to market activities. Hence,  nt is
time allocated by the household to non-market activities, which I call leisure.
Productive opportunities
A household’s date t production of the composite good is:
wst  ztnt 6
where wst  zt is that household’s technology parameter. When a household
chooses to work, it is paid its marginal product. Therefore wst  zt equals the
6 Note that this pricing policy is restricted to being a function of the current value of the
economy-wide shock, zt  only.
7 Moreover, I find that this implied process on g is significantly volatile (see the discussion in
Section 4 below).
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household’s real wage. Following Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), I
assume a labor indivisibility. Labor services, nt, are constrained to belonging
to the set {0, 1}, where zero corresponds to not being employed and one
corresponds to being employed.
Monetary arrangements
I assume that in this model economy households can hold integer amounts of
the nominal asset A  A  0  1          nA The holdings of this asset act as a
substitute for the costly insurance. These holdings are constrained to being
non-negative to explore the business cycle implications of imposing an ex-
treme form of liquidity constraints.
The households’ decision problem
Let At1 denote the end-of-period holdings of the nominal asset and At the
beginning-of-period holdings of the nominal asset, then the nominal version
of the household competitive decision problem is the following:
max
ct  nt  At1
 

t0
tuct   nt	 7	
subject to the budget constraint
ptct  At1 
 At  ptwst  zt	nt1 	 8	
The maximization is also subject to At1  A and nt   {0, 1}, and A0 is given.
Let a  At1pt denote household real currency holdings valued in terms
of the current period’s consumption good, then the functional equation for
the dynamic program solved by an a  s	-type household is the following:
va  s  z	  max
a c n
 
uc   n	  

s z
va  s  z	s  z	  s  z	

9	
subject to the budget constraint
c a 
 aez	  ws  z	n1 	 10	
where c  0  a  A  0    2          na where  denotes the real value of
one unit of currency, and n  {0, 1}. Since the household’s problem is a finite-
state, discounted dynamic program, an optimal stationary Markov plan al-
ways exists. This optimal plan and the stochastic processes on s  z	 define an
ergodic transition probability matrix on A  S  Z
2.4 Definition of equilibrium
In the nominal asset market the government is not small and, therefore, I do
not treat it as a price-taking agent. Instead, part of the specification of the
economy is the policy arrangement employed. This explicit policy arrange-
ment includes the following features: a description of the markets that op-
erate and of the liquidity constraints that are imposed on households; the
price pt at which the government exchanges the consumption good for
the nominal asset; the law of motion of these prices pt1  ptzt	  and the
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process on the income tax, . For such an arrangement a definition of a
recursive competitive equilibrium is the following:
The state of a household is the triple  a  s  z The measure of households
of type  a  s is x a  s, and x denotes the corresponding measure. The
economy-wide state is the pair  x  z
An equilibrium for a policy arrangement  z    given x0, consists of
four basic parts: a government policy g x  z  ag x  z  a household policy
c a  s  z  n a  s  z  a a  s  z  an inflation rate process e z, and a law of
motion for the measures of household types xa  s  fa  s  x  z  z

 such that:
i) Given the processes on  and e z  ptpt1  the household policy solves
the household’s optimization program described in equations (9)–(10)
above.
ii) The goods market clears:
 
a  s
x a  sc a  s  z  g y  z 
 
a  s
x a  sn a  s  zw s  z  11
for all  x  z in the support of the distribution of  xt  zt for some t.
iii) The asset market clears:
ag x  z 
 
a  s
x a  sa a  s  z  12
for all  x  z in the support of the distribution of  xt  zt for some t.
iv) Household and aggregate behavior are consistent:
fa s  x  z  z 
 
a  s	 a  z
x a  s
 s  z   s  z  13
for all  a  s  x  z  z where  a  z   a  s   a  a a  s  z8
v) The behavior of endogenous variables is consistent with the policy ar-
rangement. For our class of policy arrangements, this requires e z   z
and g x  z  0 for all  x  z in the support of the distribution of  xt  zt for
some t9.
For the set of policy arrangements that I consider, there is at most one
equilibrium. The computational procedure used to find the equilibrium is the
following: first I solve the household problem, which is a finite-state dis-
counted dynamic program. Then I use the household optimal decision rules
and the initial distribution of households to obtain a stochastic realization of
g x  z from (11). If gt  g xt  zt turns out to be a positive stochastic process,
the unique equilibrium for the given policy arrangement has been found.
Otherwise, it has been established that no equilibrium exists for that policy
8 Note that fas   x  a  s for all  a  s 	A  S
9 Note that the households’ budget constraints and the market clearing conditions imply that the
government budget constraint is also satisfied. Expressed in real terms the budget constraint
satisfied by the government is the following: gt  yt  agt  ag t1et
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arrangement. A fully documented version of the FORTRAN program used
to solve this economy is available from the author upon request.
2.5 Calibration
I calibrate the model economies’ parameters so that the size of the deviations
of logged output from trend in the baseline model economy is close to that of
the U.S. economy in the 1954–89 period. The definitions of the model ag-
gregates and of the time series considered in this paper are contained in
Appendix 1. The parameters that specify the government policy are different
for different experiments and I discuss them in Section 4. The remaining
calibration choices are the following:
Time period
Most of the U.S. time are reported quarterly. Wages, however, are paid more
frequently. The model period, therefore should be shorter than a quarter of a
year. I choose the model period to be an eighth of a year. This choice allows
for some temporal aggregation and it keeps computational costs within
reasonable bounds10 
The economy-wide exogenous process
I assume that the model economy goes through periods of good and bad
times. Consequently, the aggregate process, z, takes two values, z   {1,2},
where state z  1 represents good times and state z  2 represents bad times.
The transition probabilities on the aggregate process determine the average
duration of each of the shocks. In the U.S., business cycles last on average
for about four years (for example, Delong and Summers, 1977) and the
durations of expansions and recessions are roughly the same. I choose the
transition probabilities on z so that the model economy business cycles mimic
these features. Consequently, the average duration of both good and bad
times in the model economy is about two years which corresponds to sixteen
model periods. Given that the expected duration of a state is the reciprocal of
1 z z where z z is the probability of state z occurring again the
following period, the transition probabilities for the economy-wide process
that satisfy these conditions are the following:
z  1 z  2
z  1 0 9375 0 0625
z  2 0 0625 0 9375
The household-specific exogenous processes
I assume that the individual-specific productivity processes takes two pos-
sible values, s   1 2. State s  1 represents high productivity draws and
state s  2 represents low productivity draws, for example a qualified elec-
trician who can only find a job as a janitor. The transition probabilities are
chosen so that, on average, 92 percent of the time households experience the
10 During the calibration stage of this project I experimented with shorter model periods and I
found that they did not result in significant changes in the aggregate properties of the model.
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high productivity shock and the remaining 8 percent of the time they ex-
perience the low productivity shock. I also require that the expected duration
of the low productivity shock is of two model periods, or a quarter of a year.
These values roughly match an approximation to the average U.S. em-
ployment rate and the expected duration of unemployment in U.S. business
cycles. The transition probabilities on the individual-specific process that
satisfy these requirements are the following11:
s   1 s   2
s  1 0 9565 0 0435
s  2 0 5000 0 5000
Preferences
Following the applied general equilibrium tradition I choose a utility func-
tion with constant elasticity of substitution in consumption and leisure.
During the last 50 years, in the U.S., per capita leisure has remained virtually
constant, per capita consumption has grown at an average rate of nearly 2
percent, and real wages have increased by a factor of two. To match these
observations I assume a unit elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure. The utility function for our model economies is, therefore, the
following:
Uct  nt  1 
1 c	t  nt
1	1
 1

14
where  n is leisure.
I select preference parameters   0 995 and 	  0 33  These parameter
values imply an annual subjective time discount rate of 4 percent and a share
of leisure of approximately two-thirds. These values for the time discount
rate and for the share of leisure are in line with observations from national
income and product accounts on the net real rate of return on capital and on
the average fraction of productive time that households allocate to the
market. For the relative risk aversion coefficient, I choose   1 5  This value
is commonly used in applied general equilibrium exercises in public finance
and business cycle theory. The choice of  reflects the fact that the average
workweek including commuting time is roughly 45 hours, or approximately
45 percent of people’s weekly endowment of 14 7  98 hours of productive
time. Parameter  is, therefore, 1/0.45 = 2.22.
Productive opportunities
The values of the model economy productivity parameters, ws z are nor-
malized so that the average productivity of highly productive types is 1.0.
The relative size of the marginal productivities of households in their high
and low productivity times is approximately three. This number is chosen to
match the ratio between the average hourly wage in manufacturing and the
minimum hourly wage in the U.S. With this choice I am implicitly assuming
11 These transition probabilities for the household-specific processes are the same as those
considered in I˙mrohorog˘lu (1989).
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that there are always minimum wage openings for anyone who wants them.
Finally, the variances of the productivity parameters in good and bad times
are chosen so that, given the transitions on the exogenous processes, the
average standard deviation of the baseline economy’s log detrended ag-
gregate output series is close to the corresponding statistic for the U.S.
economy in the post-Korean war period. The resulting productivity para-
meters are the following:
s   1  z   1 s   1  z   2 s   2  z   1 s   2  z   2
ws  z 10081 09919 033673 0327657
Units and bounds
In addition to the parameters already discussed, in order for the program
described in equations (9) and (10) to be well defined I must choose the real
value of one unit of the nominal asset, , and the maximum number of units
of the asset, na. In every experiment I choose    0008 and na   500. This
results in a unit of account which is approximately 0.12 percent of per capita
yearly income of the baseline model economy. If I take U.S. per capita
income to be $20,000, the unit of account in the model economies would be
worth approximately $24. I find this unit to be sufficiently small for the
purposes of this paper. Making this unit smaller raises the computational
costs significantly and has virtually no effect on the aggregate properties of
the model. Finally, the choices for parameters  and na imply that the
maximum value of total asset holdings is 4. This value is sufficiently large so
that the constraint a Ap is never binding in equilibrium.
3 The full insurance economy
To offer a suitable term of comparison I also analyze the business cycle
behavior of another economy which only differs from the economy described
above in the insurance technology. Specifically, in the full insurance economy
I assume that there is a technology that makes it possible for contracts
conditional on the realizations of the household-specific productivity shocks
to be enforced. Moreover an event-contingent scheme that eliminates all but
aggregate uncertainty is assumed to exist. This scheme works as follows:
Each period there are  xts households of type s and revenues must be raised
to finance gt units of government consumption12. Given that households are
risk-averse, at the beginning of each period before the idiosyncratic processes
are realized, they enter into contracts that equate the marginal utility of
consumption of workers and non-workers regardless of the realizations of
their shocks and, therefore, of their individual marginal productivities.
Prescott and Townsend (1984) show that the full insurance allocation in an
environment similar to this one can be supported as a competitive equilibrium
with lotteries. In this paper I solve the centralized version of this problem.
12 Note that both measures of households and the sequence of government consumptions are
identical to those that obtain in the limited insurance economy which has been solved first.
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Specifically, given the labor income tax rate, , and the amount of govern-
ment consumption, gt, the social planner simultaneously determines the
measure of households of each type who work in the market,  nt s, the
consumption levels for workers, c1, and non-workers, c0, that equate the
marginal utilities of consumption across types, and the level of lump-sum
taxes or transfers, T  g  z, needed to balance the government budget. The
contract also specifies that highly productive households are always chosen
to work first, and that in those periods when only a fraction of the house-
holds of a given type are required to work, the workers are selected randomly
amongst all households of that type. The main features of this model
economy and of the problem solved by the planner are described in the
subsections below.
3.1 The household sector
There is a continuum of households with total measure one. As was the case
in the limited insurance economy, the households in this model economy
order their random streams of consumption and leisure according to (5), and
they are heterogeneous with respect to the realizations of a household-spe-
cific productivity shock, s. At each point in time the measure of households
of type s is  xt s. The initial measure of household types is  x0. To make this
economy comparable with the limited insurance economy, I impose that
 x0 s 
 
aA x0 a  s for every s.
3.2 Information and production opportunities
The properties and realizations of the stochastic processes, the timing of the
information and the nature of the production technologies are identical to
the corresponding ones of the limited insurance economy described above.
3.3 The social planner’s problem
Given the realization of the economy-wide shock, z, the measures of
households of each type,  x s, the labor income tax rate policy, , and the
amount of government consumption, g, each period the social planner de-
termines the consumption allocations for workers and non-workers, c0  c1,
the measures of workers for each type  n s, and the level of lump-sum taxes,
T , that solve the problem described in (15)–(19) below. Note that since it is
assumed that no assets are held in this economy, the social planner problem
is static.
max
c1 c0 n s T

s
 n s   T u c1   1 

s
	x s  n s   T 
u c0  
 
 15
s.t.

s
n s   T c1 

s
	x s  n s   T 
c0 

s
n s   T w s  z 1   T  16
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g   
 
s
 nts   T ws  z  T 17
ns   T   xs 18
for s   1  2       ns 
c0 c1 ns   T   0 19
for s   1 2     ns  By solving the program above, the social planner is
treating each household symmetrically and maximizing total utility. Since
contracts are signed before the productivity shock is realized and since all
households are ex-ante identical, I consider symmetry to be a reasonable
choice of social weights for this economy13 
4 The experiments
To compare the aggregate fluctuations implied by the two insurance tech-
nologies explored in this paper, I carry out the following three computational
experiments. Since in the U.S. throughout the 1926–90 period annual infla-
tion rates averaged about 4 percent, in Experiment 1 I explore the business
cycle properties of a model economy in which the annual inflation rate is 4
percent. I refer to this economy as the baseline economy14. To gain addi-
tional intuition about the behavior of this class of model worlds, in Ex-
periments 2 and 3, I explore the business cycle implications of both lower and
higher inflation rates. Specifically, in Experiment 2 the inflation rate is chosen
to be zero and in Experiment 3 it is chosen to be 10 percent. Throughout the
three sets of experiments, labor income is taxed at a rate of 25 percent. This
value is chosen to roughly match average income taxes in the United States.
The policy parameters for the three experiments are reported in Table 1.
Note that even though the processes on g are identical in the limited and in
the full insurance economies of each experiment, they differ across experi-
ments. Consequently, the process on government supply of the nominal as-
Table 1. Government policy parameters
Inflation rate ()
%
Tax rate ()
%
Experiment 1 4 25
Experiment 2 0 25
Experiment 3 10 25
13 Prescott and Townsend (1984) show that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this problem are
sufficient for a maximum and that the solution is unique. A detailed description of the algorithm
and the FORTRAN program used to solve this problem are available from the author upon
request.
14 Note that this rate of inflation implies a real rate of return on nominal assets of –4 percent,
which is well below the intertemporal substitution rate of the model economy households.
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set, ag, of the limited insurance economy, and the sequence of lump-sum
taxes, Tt  of the perfect insurance economy also differ across experiments.
4.1 Findings
4.1.1 The calibration exercise
To calibrate the model economy I try different variances of the productivity
shock until I match the fluctuations of U.S. output in the post-Korean war
period. Table 2 reports the results of this exercise. Table 3 contains the
corresponding set of statistics for the U.S. economy during the 1954–89
period as reported in Kydland and Prescott (1990). The fact that there is no
capital accumulation in the model economy and the role played by govern-
ment consumption should be kept in mind when evaluating these results.
Some significant features of the cyclical behavior of the model economy are
Table 2. The cyclical behavior of the calibrated model economy (deviations from trend)
Variable x Volatility
(% std. dev.)
Cross-correlation of output with
x(t–3) x(t–2) x(t–1) x(t) x(t+1) x(t+2) x(t+3)
Output 1.74 –0.10 –0.09 0.12 1.00 0.13 –0.09 –0.10
(0.002) (0.078) (0.083) (0.069) (0.000) (0.069) (0.085) (0.074)
Consumption 0.59 –0.14 –0.13 0.06 0.81 0.42 0.22 0.11
(0.001) (0.078) (0.081) (0.071) (0.027) (0.059) (0.085) (0.091)
Government 5.24 –0.08 –0.08 0.13 0.98 0.04 –0.18 –0.16
consumption (0.006) (0.077) (0.084) (0.068) (0.004) (0.064) (0.084) (0.070)
Hours 1.46 –0.08 –0.07 0.13 0.95 –0.04 –0.23 –0.19
(0.002) (0.073) (0.082) (0.064) (0.012) (0.064) (0.086) (0.072)
Wage 0.59 –0.11 –0.09 0.05 0.62 0.49 0.30 0.16
(0.001) (0.081) (0.078) (0.076) (0.040) (0.047) (0.084) (0.099)
Table 3. The cyclical behavior of the U.S. economy: 1954–89 (deviations from trend)a
Variable x Volatility
(% std.dev.)
Cross-correlation of the real GNP with
x(t–3) x(t–2) x(t–1) x(t) x(t+1) x(t+2) x(x+3)
Output 1.71 0.38 0.63 0.85 1.00 0.85 0.63 0.38
Consumptionb 0.84 0.53 0.67 0.77 0.76 0.63 0.46 0.27
Investimentc 5.38 0.44 0.64 0.83 0.90 0.81 0.60 0.35
Gvt purchasesd 2.07 –0.03 –0.01 –0.01 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.17
Hourse 1.47 0.23 0.44 0.69 0.86 0.86 0.75 0.59
Wagef 0.88 0.34 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.21 –0.02 –0.25
aSource: Citicorp’s Citibase data bank. Sample period: 1954:1–1989:4.
bNon-durables and services.
cFixed investment.
dIncludes federal, state and local government purchases.
eHousehold survey.
fGNP/hours (household survey).
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the following i.) in the model economy private consumption fluctuates 30
percent less, and government consumption 2.5 times more, than in the U.S.
economy15, ii.) the fluctuations of hours in the model economy is surpris-
ingly close to the fluctuations of hours in the U.S. economy, iii.) the model
economy displays a high degree of contemporaneous correlation between
output, hours, private consumption and government consumption, and iv.)
the model economy displays a dampened propagation of the productivity
shocks. This last result arises in part from the fact that, unlike capital ac-
cumulation, the nominal assets held in this economy for consumption
smoothing purposes play no role in production.
4.1.2 The aggregate fluctuations of the model economies
Fluctuations in output
As can be seen from the first two rows of Table 4, fluctuations in both
output, y, and hours of labor services, h, are larger under the limited in-
surance technology than under the full insurance technology. More specifi-
cally, aggregate output in the limited insurance economies of Experiments 1,
2 and 3 fluctuates, respectively, 25%, 21% and 21% more than aggregate
output in the corresponding full insurance economies16.
The intuition behind this result is the following: while the full insurance
technology allows households to pool their household-specific components
of risk contemporaneously, the limited insurance technology allows house-
holds to improve their life-time allocations of consumption and leisure in-
dividually by varying their asset holdings intertemporally. In this latter case
Table 4. Fluctuations in output, hours and productivity
e(z) = 1.00 e(z) = 1.04 e(z) = 1.10
L.Ia F.I. L.I F.I. L.I F.I.
by 2.583 2.062 1.744 1.439 1.353 1.111
h 2.188 1.622 1.455 1.104 1.085 0.811
h/y 0.847 0.787 0.834 0.767 0.802 0.730
h/w 3.753 2.787 2.479 1.900 1.836 1.393
(h,w) 0.605 0.679 0.340 0.398 0.235 0.249
aL.I. is the abbreviation of limited insurance and F.I. is the abbreviation of full insurance.
bx denotes the percentage standard deviation of logged, detrended x.
15 These properties of the model economy are discussed at length in the subsection below.
16 Prescott (1986), page 21, states that ‘‘a final example of an interesting and not yet answered
question is how much would the behaviour of the Hansen (1985) indivisible labor economy
change if agents did not have access to a technology to insure against random unemployment
and instead had to self-insure against unemployment by holding liquid assets?’’. The
computational experiments carried out in this paper are an attempt to provide a numerical
answer to his question.
14
households build up their nominal asset holdings in good times and deplete
them when the times are bad in order to smooth out their streams of con-
sumption in the presence of time-varying production opportunities. This
increased labour when the sun shines and increased leisure when it rains
accounts for the higher volatility of output and hours in this model economy.
On the other hand, under the full insurance technology, households have no
incentives to accumulate nominal assets and, consequently, they have neither
a reason for additional work in good times, nor the possibility of financing
consumption without work in bad times. Hence, fluctuations in both em-
ployment and output are smaller in this economy. Furthermore, by always
requiring the highly productive households to work first, the contracts sup-
ported by the full insurance technology cushion the fluctuations induced by
the household-specific productivity component even further.
Fluctuations in hours and productivity
Accounting for the cyclical behaviour of the labour market has always been
considered one of the major challenges faced by equilibrium business cycle
theory. The last three rows of Table 4 report three sets of statistics that
describe the labor market fluctuations of the model economies. I find that in
the limited insurance economies the relative fluctuations of hours and output
are approximately 10% larger than in the corresponding full insurance
economies. In the baseline limited insurance model economy the value for
this statistic is h y   0834  the value reported by Kydland and Prescott
(1990) for the U.S. economy using the household survey estimates of ag-
gregate hours is 0.8617 while Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990) report a
value of 0.62 for a model economy that includes indivisible labor, Rogerson
(1988) employment lotteries and shocks to both technology and government
consumption. I find that introducing limitations in the insurance technology
increases the relative volatility of hours and output and therefore represents a
move in the right direction.
The fourth row of Table 4 reports the volatility of hours relative to the
average real wage, w, which is also the average productivity of labor. I find
that the limited insurance technology entails a response of aggregate hours to
changes in the average real wage that is about 30% larger than the one that
obtains under full insurance. This result, and the smaller correlation of hours
and the average real wage reported in the fifth row of that same table, are
implications of the different substitution and income effects that arise when
variations in asset holdings are used to substitute for the consumption-
smoothing role of income insurance. The value for the relative variability of
hours and productivity reported by Kydland and Prescott (1990) for the U.S.
economy is 1.6218, while Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990) report a value of
1.36 for their indivisible labor two-shock model economy. Again, I find that
17 Kydland and Prescott (1990) use Citicorp’s Citibase quarterly data for 1954–1989. The value
for the same statistic using the measure of hours reported in the business surveys is 0.96.
18 The value for this statistic using the measure of hours reported in the business surveys is 1.81,
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introducing limitations in the insurance technology increases the volatility of
hours relative to changes in the real wage, and, therefore, it also results in a
move in the right direction along this dimension.
Finally, the last row of Table 4 reports the correlation of hours worked
and the average real wage. As far as this statistic is concerned, Prescott
(1986) implicitly acknowledges, and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990)
forcefully argue, that the key remaining deviation between theory and ob-
servations is, precisely, that technology driven real business cycle models
present a large positive correlation between hours worked and the return to
working, while in the U.S. economy both variables are virtually un-
correlated19. The intuition is that in models where productivity shocks are
the only source of aggregate fluctuations, the demand for labor shifts about
about a static, upward sloping labor supply curve and, therefore, this gen-
erates a large positive correlation between labor services and their price.
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990) go on to show that including shocks to
government consumption as an additional source of fluctuations improves
the performance of the model economy significantly, and they report a value
of 0.73 for their two-shock indivisible labor model economy.
The results reported here show that the limited insurance technology
reduces the correlation of hours and the real wage in about 10%. We have
already seen that implementing the limited insurance arrangement implies
large fluctuations in government consumption, hence it is not surprising that
the values reported here are considerably smaller than those that obtain in
the standard one-shock real business cycle models. What is more interesting
is to note that the correlation of hours worked and the real wage is con-
sistently smaller in the limited insurance than in the full insurance economies,
again as the result of the different income and substitution effects implied by
each arrangement. These results suggest that the inclusion of uninsured
components of household-specific income risk in equilibrium business cycle
models would also improve their performance along this dimension.
Fluctuations in private and government consumption
Table 5 reports the relative fluctuations of output, y, private consumption, c,
and government consumption, g  I find that fluctuations in private con-
sumption relative to income are consistently smaller in the limited insurance
economies. I conclude therefore that the limited insurance technology ana-
lyzed in this paper supports smoother streams of consumption relative to
income than the full insurance technology. It should be noted, however, that
this consumption smoothing is obtained at the expense of greater variability
of hours relative to income (see the third row of Table 4) and, hence, of a
greater variability of leisure relative to income.
As far as the volatility of government consumption is concerned, I find
that implementing the limited insurance arrangement entails large fluctua-
19 Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990) use Citicorp’s Database for 1955–83 and report for this
variable a value of –0.20 for the U.S. economy.
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tions in government consumption. From the consolidation of the individual
households’ budget constraints and the market clearing condition, one can
easily show that:
g   y   a 
a
e
  
20
i.e., that government consumption equals government revenues plus the
aggregate addition to private savings. This addition to private savings in the
limited insurance economies plays the role of investment in standard business
cycle models and, as is the case of investment, presents fluctuations that
range from 2.5 to 3 times the variations in income. When comparing both
classes of economies, I find that the relative volatility of government con-
sumption is roughly 20% smaller in the limited insurance economies than in
the corresponding full insurance economies. This result follows from the fact
that the sequences of government consumptions are identical across both
types of economies while output is more volatile under the limited insurance
arrangement.
5 Concluding comments
In this paper I evaluate the business cycle implications of uninsured idio-
syncratic risk and liquidity constraints. To this purpose I compare the ag-
gregate fluctuations of two model economies that differ in the insurance
technologies available to households only. I find that under the limited in-
surance technology output and hours are more volatile, the relative fluc-
tuations of hours and output is larger, hours worked are less correlated with
the average real wage, and consumption paths are smoother than those that
obtain under the full insurance technology. One interpretation of these re-
sults is that including uninsured components of aggregate risk into equili-
brium business cycle models would most likely improve their performance
along those margins.
An extension of this research is to relax the extreme form of liquidity
constraints analyzed in this paper and to explore the business cycle implica-
tions of assuming that there is an explicit financial intermediation technology
that allows for some borrowing. One step in this direction has already been
Table 5. Fluctuations in private and government consumption
e(z) = 1.00 e(z) = 1.04 e(z) = 1.10
L.Ia F.I. L.I F.I. L.I F.I.
by 2.583 2.062 1.744 1.439 1.353 1.111
c/y 0.264 0.347 0.338 0.471 0.443 0.596
g/y 3.104 3.894 3.009 3.625 2.851 3.484
aL.I. is the abbreviation of limited insurance and F.I. is the abbreviation of full insurance.
bx denotes the percentage standard deviation of logged, detrended x.
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taken in Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (1992). If bankruptcy and any other disruptive
effects that arise from the financial intermediation sector are precluded, it
seems safe to conjecture that, if borrowing were allowed, the aggregate fluc-
tuations of the limited and full insurance economies would be closer. Another
important extension of this line of research would be to model capital accu-
mulation. Conceptually this extension is straight forward, but, technically, it
requires to make prices dependant on the distribution of households. Two
attempts to solve this difficult computational issue can be found in Krussell
and Smith (1994) and in Castan˜eda et al. (1995). Once the computational
problems are solved, it would be interesting to explore the business cycle
properties of an economy where nominal assets are held for consumption
smoothing purposes and where capital is used as an input in production.
Appendix 1
a. Defintions of the model aggregates
For each simulation of the model economies I compute the following ag-
gregates:
1. Aggregate real gross income
y  
 
a s
w s  zn a  s  zx a  s  21
2. End-of-period aggregate real asset holdings20
m 
 
a s
a a  s  zx a  s  22
3. Aggregate real consumption
c 
m
1
e z
 y 1   m  23
4. Aggregate employment21
h 
 
a s
n a  s  zx a  s  24
b. Definitions of quarterly time series
I then used the model aggregates to construct quarterly time series for some
of the basic macroeconomic variables. In so doing, I followed as closely as
possible the procedures actually used for U.S. data. Flows are therefore
quoted annually. Subscript i denotes the i-th subperiod of each quarter. Since
the model period was chosen to be one-eighth of a year, i=1,2. I computed
the following variables:
20 This aggregate was only computed for the for the limited insurance economy.
21 Since the measure of households is 1, levels and rates are equal
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1. Real output
y   4 y1  y2  25
2. Real consumption
c  4 c1  c2  26
3. Real government consumption
g  y  c  27
4. Aggregate labor input
h  4 h1  h20 45  28
5. Average labor compensation
w  y h  29
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